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Abstract—History has shown that attacks against network-
connected software based systems are common and dangerous.
An important fraction of these attacks exploit implementation
details of the software based system. These attacks – sometimes
called low-level attacks – rely on characteristics of the hardware,
compiler or operating system used to execute software programs
to make these programs misbehave, or to extract sensitive
information from them. With the increased Internet-connectivity
of embedded devices, including industrial control systems, sensors
as well as consumer devices, there is a substantial risk that similar
attacks will target these devices.
This tutorial paper explains the vulnerabilities, attacks and
countermeasures relevant for low-level software security. The
paper discusses software security for two different attacker
models: the classic model of an attacker that can only interact
with the program by providing input and reading output, and the
more recent and challenging model of an attacker that controls
part of the execution platform on which the software runs, for
instance because the attacker has compromised the operating
system, or some of the libraries that the software under attack
relies on.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is about maintaining desirable properties of sys-
tems in the presence of intelligent adversaries. Hence, to define
a security problem, one must define (1) the system under
consideration, (2) the desirable properties that one wishes to
maintain (the security objective), and (3) the capabilities the
attacker or adversary is assumed to have (the attacker model).
Software security, obviously, studies the case where the
system is a software based system. History has shown that
software based systems, and in particular systems that are
connected to the Internet, are vulnerable to a wide variety of
attacks. Attacks against software can take many forms, but this
paper focuses specifically on attacks that exploit implementa-
tion details of the platform (i.e. the hardware and software
infrastructure) on which the software is executing. These
attacks range from the classic stack-smashing attack [1] to
modern attack techniques like Return-Oriented-Programming
(ROP) attacks [2] or memory scanning malware [3].
This class of attacks (sometimes dubbed low-level software
attacks) has been one of the most damaging classes of attacks
on the Internet over the past decades. With the increased
Internet-connectivity of embedded devices, including indus-
trial control systems, sensors as well as consumer devices,
there is a substantial risk that similar attacks will also be
launched against such devices.
In this paper, we consider software systems that are com-
piled from source code, and we consider a very general
security objective: the compiled system should behave as
specified in the source code that it is compiled from (and only
as specified in the source code, i.e. no additional unexpected
functionality). This security objective defends against a very
wide range of attacks that exploit platform implementation
details, including all the example attacks mentioned above. For
instance, the behaviour of a vulnerable program under a stack-
smashing attack diverges completely from what is specified in
the source code of the program.
We can study this security objective for compiled software
systems under different attacker models. The most widely
studied attacker model considers an attacker that can provide
input to, and read output from a compiled program. The
attacker’s goal is to choose the inputs in such a way that
behaviour of the running program deviates from the behaviour
specified in the source code. Of course, attackers often have a
very specific deviating behaviour in mind (like getting a root
shell on the computer under attack, or installing a root-kit on
that computer) but from a defense point of view, it makes sense
to consider any behaviour that deviates from what is specified
in the source code as an attack.
Such attacks are possible in this attacker model against
software that is written in unsafe languages like C or C++
and that contains so-called memory safety vulnerabilities. We
discuss those vulnerabilities in Section III, as well as the wide
range of attacks and countermeasures that has been studied in
the past decades for this attacker model.
In some cases however, a more powerful attacker model
is appropriate. In Section IV, we consider attackers that
can provide part of the compiled code of a program. This
attacker model is relevant for software that consists of multiple
modules or components that are compiled separately and then
linked together, and loaded to be executed. Such software
often includes compiled modules from third parties, and in
this attacker model we consider attackers that can arbitrarily
modify one or more of these modules. The model also includes
attackers that can modify code (for instance to install malware)
in the more privileged operating system layer.
We assume that readers of this paper have programming
experience in an imperative programming language like C,
and have a general understanding of how such languages are
compiled to a standard von Neumann style computer that
executes low-level, unstructured machine code. In the next
Section, we briefly recap some details of this compilation
process that are important to understand the attacks and
countermeasures in this paper, but this is not intended to
be a self-contained introduction to computer architecture and
compilation. Readers who need to refresh that background
more extensively should consult a relevant textbook [4].
II. SOURCE CODE, MACHINE CODE AND COMPILATION
Most software is developed as source code in a high-
level programming language and subsequently compiled to
machine code for execution. The difference between source
code and machine code is substantial. In high-level languages
like C, control flow is structured, there is a strict separation
between code and data, and most languages support features
that allow developers to define and enforce abstractions or
to hide information behind interfaces. At machine code level,
there is a single virtual address space, where both code and
data are represented as binary n-bit words and where control
flow is unstructured. For the examples in the paper, we will
assume a 32-bit memory address space, i.e. virtual memory
consists of 232 bytes. The processor has 32-bit registers and
a single instruction can load a 32-bit word (i.e. 4 bytes) from
memory to a register.
Figure 1 illustrates the difference between source and ma-
chine code, and also illustrates some details of the compilation
process.
Part (a) of the Figure shows a very simple C program that is
intended to be representative of a server process. In the main
method, it should first initialize, listen on a network socket
and accept connections (code not shown), and then it calls the
process () method passing it a file descriptor that can be used
to communicate on the established connection. The process()
method uses a get request() method to read a request of the
connection.
Part (b) of the Figure shows the compiled code for the
process() method. Both the assembly code, as well as the
machine code (in hexadecimal notation) are shown, and com-
ments clarify what the code is doing. In particular, the code
shows how the necessary management information associated
with this specific function invocation is maintained on the
call stack. The base pointer is a processor register that points
to the base of the stack record associated with the current
function invocation. The machine code of process() starts with
saving the old base pointer (the one associated with the main()
function invocation), and then sets the new base pointer to
the top of the stack. Next, it allocates space on the stack
by subtracting 0x18 from the stack pointer (note that this
grows the stack, as the stack grows towards lower memory
addresses). This includes space for the local variable (buf),
as well as space for the two parameters that will be passed
to get request() in the first statement of process(). The two
parameters are copied into that allocated space, and then the
call to get process() happens.
Part (c) of the figure shows a snapshot of (parts of) the run-
time state of the process executing the compiled program at the
point where it has just entered the get request() function. You
can recognize the stack records (also called activation records)
of the process() function invocation and of the get request()
function invocation. You can also see the machine code of the
process() function at some other place in memory: it is stored
starting at address 0x080483f2, in little-endian byte order (i.e.
the first byte is stored in the least significant byte of the word
at address 0x080483f2).
Two of the processor registers – the Instruction Pointer (IP)
and the Stack Pointer (SP) – are also shown, and point to code
of the get request() function and the top of the stack record
for the get request() invocation (which is at this point in time
the top activation record on the stack) respectively.
While not all details in the Figure are important, the
Figure does illustrate the huge abstraction gap between source
code and machine code. At run-time, the entire state of the
executing program (including its code, its data and information
about what point of execution the program has reached) is
maintained in memory and in processor registers; the run-time
state is essentially just a large collection of 32-bit words.
Depending on many factors, including at least the precise
characteristics of the source language, the way in which the
source code is compiled to machine code and the way in which
attackers can interact with the compiled code, attackers can
exploit the characteristics of the machine code level to make
software misbehave in dangerous ways.
We will illustrate some of these potential exploits in the next
Sections, referring back to Figure 1 for some of the examples.
III. LOW-LEVEL SOFTWARE SECURITY IN THE I/O
ATTACKER MODEL
In the I/O attacker model, the attacker can only provide
input to, and observe output of the program. This is an
appropriate model, for instance, for attackers interacting with
server software over a network connection, and these classes
of attacks have been among the most important security issues
for networked software for several decades.
A program is vulnerable under this attacker model only
if it contains memory safety vulnerabilities: bugs that may
cause the program to write to memory cells not allocated
to the program. We study these vulnerabilities in Subsec-
tion III-A. The presence of these vulnerabilities enables a
wide range of attack techniques, some of which we explore
in Subsection III-B. Countermeasures for such attacks have
been studied for decades, and we provide a brief survey of
important countermeasures in Subsection III-C.
A. Memory safety vulnerabilities
Source languages like C support mutable state, i.e. the
source language has constructs for allocating and deallocating
memory that can subsequently be assigned to, or read from.
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void get_request(int fd, char buf[]) {
read(fd,buf,16); 
} 
void process(int fd) { 
char buf[16]; 
get_request(fd,buf); 
// Process the request (code not shown)
} 
void main() { 
int fd = 1; 
// Initialize server, wait for a connection
// Accept connection, with file descriptor fd
// Finally, process the request:
process(fd); 
}
55 push   %ebp ; save base pointer
89 e5 mov %esp,%ebp ; set new base pointer
83 ec 18 sub     $0x18,%esp           ; allocate stack record
8d 45 f0 lea     -0x10(%ebp),%eax; put buf in %eax
89 44 24 04  mov %eax,0x4(%esp) ; and push on the stack
8b 45 08 mov 0x8(%ebp),%eax ; put fd parameter in %eax
89 04 24 mov %eax,(%esp)          ; and push on the stack
e8 e3 ff ff ff call    0x80483ed ; call get_request
c9 leave  ; deallocate stack frame
c3 ret    ; return
(a) Program source code
(b) Machine code for process() function (c) Run-time machine state
Fig. 1. This figure illustrates the relationship between source code and run-time machine state.
Part (a) shows a simple source code program.
Part (b) shows the compiled version of one of the functions in that program. Both the machine code (in hexadecimal) as well as the corresponding assembly
code is shown. Note for instance that assembly code instructions have variable lengths: they are between 1 and 5 bytes long.
Part (c) shows a snapshot of the run-time machine state while this program is executing. It shows parts of the memory address space, as well as the Instruction
Pointer (IP) and Stack Pointer (SP), at the point when the program has just entered the get request() function. Note that the machine code shown in part (b)
is stored in memory using a little-endian byte order.
At run-time, on the machine code level, these memory
cells allocated for use in the program will be part of the
same virtual address space where also program code, and
management information to track the structured control flow
will be stored. For example, in Figure 1, the local variable buf
of the process() function is allocated at address 0xbfffefcc and
occupies 4 words (each containing 4 bytes). In the snapshot
of memory shown in Figure 1, the buf variable contains the
string ”ABCDEFGHIJKLMNO”: the ASCII codes of these
characters are stored (in little-endian order) in the 4 words
allocated to buf, ending with a null byte.
In the presence of bugs in the source program, it is possible
that the program writes to memory cells that are not allocated
for use in the program, and in certain circumstances this can
cause the program to modify program code or management
information in dangerous ways. For instance, in Figure 1, we
can introduce such a bug in the get request() function by
replacing the third parameter of the read call with 32 instead
of 16. Now, input provided to the program might overflow the
space allocated to the buf variable by 16 bytes (4 words), and
hence it can for instance overwrite the saved return address
stored at address 0xbfffefe0.
A memory safety vulnerability is a bug where a program
reads or writes to a memory cell not currently allocated to the
program. In C-like languages, these bugs come in two forms.
A program has a spatial vulnerability, if it accesses a range
of cells (typically an array) that is allocated to the program, but
due to insufficient or buggy checking these accesses might go
out of bounds. The example above is an example of a spatial
memory safety vulnerability. The term buffer overflow is often
used as a synonym for such spatial vulnerabilities.
A program has a temporal vulnerability, if the program
accesses a cell that was once allocated to the program, but
has since been deallocated. Such deallocation can happen
implicitly or explicitly. If for instance the process() function
in Figure 1 were to return buf to the main() function, and the
main() function would access buf, for instance by reading input
into buf, this would be an example of a temporal vulnerability:
since it is a local variable, the buf array is only valid during
the invocation of process() and is deallocated (implicitly, by
deallocation of the corresponding stack activation record) on
return of process().
The range of memory cells the attacker can illegitimately
access depends on the vulnerability. For instance, in the spatial
vulnerability example above, the attacker can modify 16 bytes
(4 words) of memory outside of the buffer’s allocated memory
space, more specifically the words with addresses 0xbfffefdc
– 0xbfffefe8. In a vulnerability where the program performs
a buf[i] = v assignment, where both i and v come from input
channels and hence can be controlled by the attacker, the
range of cells modifiable by the attacker is essentially the
entire virtual address space (taking into account that this kind
of indexing will wrap around when the top of memory is
reached). The attacker can modify the contents at one address
of his choosing in the entire memory address range.
B. Attack techniques
An attacker will try to find input values to send to the
program such that a memory safety vulnerability is triggered.
The behavior of a program in which such a vulnerability
has been triggered is undefined according to the C language
specification. In other words, the source program does not give
any information anymore on how the program will behave
from that point onward. In practice, what happens when a
program accesses memory out of bounds, or memory that has
been deallocated, depends on low-level details of the compiler,
operating system and/or hardware. Often, the program will just
crash.
The attacker should use his knowledge about the low-
level details of the executing program to make the program
do more useful things than just crashing. The oldest and
most widely known technique is stack smashing with direct
code injection [1]. This attack exploits spatial vulnerabilities
on stack allocated buffers, like the example vulnerability
discussed above. For that example, the attack would essentially
go as follows: the attacker provides input that get request()
stores into buf, and by providing more than 16 bytes the
attacker overwrites first the saved base pointer and then the
saved return address. When the get request() function, and
subsequently the process() function return, this modified return
address will be popped from the stack into the Instruction
Pointer register, and the processor continues execution at this
address of the attacker’s choosing. The attacker will hence set
the return address to such a value that the processor starts
executing code that the attacker wants to execute. He can for
instance set the return address to 0xbfffefcc, the address of buf.
Then the processor will start loading bytes from that address,
interpreting them as instructions, and executing them. Since
the attacker provides these bytes as input, he can essentially
choose what code the processor will execute. This technique,
where the attacker brings machine code into memory as data
is called direct code injection.
Over the past decades, a wide range of attack techniques
has been developed. Some important examples include:
• Overwriting code pointers: the attacker overwrites a
memory cell that will at some later point be loaded in the
Instruction Pointer register. Examples of such memory
cells include the saved return addresses in activation
records on the stack (as discussed above), or memory
cells that contain function pointers. For instance, a sort-
ing function can take as a parameter a pointer to the
comparison function that should be used for sorting. If
the attacker can modify the pointer to the comparison
function, control flow will be hijacked on the point where
the comparison function is called through the function
pointer.
• Code corruption attacks: instead of overwriting a code
pointer, the attacker can overwrite the machine code
of a part of the program that will later be executed.
For example, referring to Figure 1 again, the attacker
could overwrite the bytes starting at 0x0804840a, where
execution will continue after return of the get request()
function. (Obviously, the attacker would need a vulner-
ability that gives him a range of accessible cells that
includes these cells).
• Code reuse attacks: instead of redirecting control flow to
a location in data memory as in the direct code injection
example above, the attacker can redirect the control flow
to existing code in code memory. Several variations
of this technique exist: in a return-to-libc attack, the
attacker will divert control flow to an existing useful
function (typically a function defined in the libc library).
In a Return-Oriented-Programming (ROP) attack [2], the
attacker will divert control flow to a code fragment (called
a trampoline) that (1) resets the Stack Pointer (SP) to
a memory address whose contents is controlled by the
attacker, and (2) returns. On this return, control flow will
continue to the address that the SP points to (and hence is
under control of the attacker). The attacker chooses this to
be an address to another code fragment (called a gadget)
that ends with a return instruction. Where this return will
go is again chosen by the attacker, and by continuing
this process the attacker can execute a sequence of such
gadgets. It has been shown that by combining such
gadgets, the attacker can essentially do anything he wants.
These code reuse attacks are particularly useful in cases
where there are countermeasures active that prevent the
attacker from doing code corruption or from injecting
code as data (direct code injection).
• Data-only attacks: instead of overwriting code pointers or
code, the attacker can choose to overwrite the contents
of another mutable variable in the program. A typical
example would be to overwrite a boolean variable (e.g.
isAdmin) that impacts the actions that the program under
attack can perform. By modifying through a memory
safety vulnerability the variable isAdmin from false to
true, the attacker is now allowed to perform administra-
tive actions.
• Information leaks: all examples we have discussed so
far violate the integrity of certain memory cells. But
also confidentiality attacks are possible. By reading past
the bounds of a buffer, the program might leak confi-
dential information such as cryptographic keys (this is
essentially what was possible with the famous Heartbleed
vulnerability). In addition, leaking the contents of parts
of memory may allow the attacker to bypass some of the
countermeasure we discuss further in this paper [5].
All these attack techniques are well understood and well
documented. Erlingsson et al. [6] discuss detailed examples
of many of these attack techniques, and Szekeres et al. [7]
develop and describe a general model of these memory cor-
ruption attacks.
C. Countermeasures
Because of the widespread nature of the attacks discussed in
the previous Subsection, there has been a substantial amount
of research on countermeasures [8], [7], and several of these
countermeasures are now widely adopted in practice.
We distinguish between countermeasures that counter ex-
ploitation of vulnerabilities during execution of the soft-
ware (for instance by making some of the attack techniques
discussed above substantially harder), and countermeasures
that counter the introduction of memory safety vulnerabilities
during the development or testing of the software.
1) Countering exploitation of vulnerabilities: The follow-
ing three countermeasures are now widely adopted in most
server and desktop software platforms, including the Windows
platform and most Unix variants.
• Stack canaries [9] are a cheap and straightforward coun-
termeasure against stack smashing: the compiler emits
code to (1) place a (for the attacker) unpredictable value
– the canary – in each activation record between the local
variables and the saved registers (base pointer and stack
pointer), and (2) checks that this value is not modified
before returning from a function call. If an attacker were
to overwrite a saved return address by overflowing a stack
allocated buffer, he also necessarily needs to overwrite
the canary, and hence this will be detected before the
overwritten return address is used.
• Data Execution Prevention (DEP): marking the code seg-
ment non-writable and the data segment non-executable
is a simple countermeasure against direct code injection:
the attacker can no longer bring data in memory and then
later have it executed as code.
• Finally, Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR),
introduces artificial randomness into the memory layout
of a process, making it harder for an attacker to (1) predict
interesting memory locations (like the location of a saved
return address) to overwrite, and (2) write a (for the
attacker) useful value – like the address of a trampoline
or gadget to jump to – to these memory locations.
While the combination of these countermeasures raises the
bar for attackers, it is commonly accepted that many memory
safety vulnerabilities remain exploitable through clever com-
binations of attack techniques.
2) Countering introduction of vulnerabilities: Instead of
countering the exploitation of memory safety vulnerabilities,
it is even better to make sure that they are not present. A wide
range of techniques exists to assist developers in writing safe
code. Three important classes of techniques are:
• The use of safe languages, like Java or C#. These lan-
guages are designed such that a combination of compiler-
enforced bounds checks (to avoid spatial vulnerabilities)
and automated garbage collection (to avoid temporal vul-
nerabilities) can provide hard assurance that no memory
safety vulnerabilities are present. There is currently a
growing interest in more C-like languages that compile to
machine code and give the programmer more control over
memory management, while still providing substantial
memory safety guarantees through type checking. A pro-
totypical example is the Rust programming language [10],
strongly influenced by the Cyclone language [11].
• If switching to a safe language is not an option, best-
practice dictates a combination of coding guidelines [12],
and code review. Source code analysis tools can help
during code review. Some tools require little developer
effort, but suffer from false positives and false nega-
tives [13], other tools can provide very high assurance
about memory safety but require a substantial amount of
effort [14], [15].
• Testing for the presence of memory safety vulnerabilities
is made significantly more effective with the use of run-
time checks that check for unsafe memory accesses [16],
[17]. While such run-time checks often impose a per-
formance overhead that is unacceptable in production
systems, this overhead can be acceptable during testing,
and they help ensure that every illegal memory access is
detected during test runs.
Again, none of these techniques is a silver bullet. Code review
and testing can suffer from false negatives: even well reviewed
and well tested code can still contain bugs. And even safe
languages often link to libraries written in an unsafe language,
or allow the programmer to write potentially unsafe code in
well marked parts of the programs (for instance, unsafe blocks
in C# or Rust).
IV. LOW-LEVEL SOFTWARE SECURITY IN THE MACHINE
CODE ATTACKER MODEL
In the I/O attacker model, software without memory safety
vulnerabilities is immune to low-level attacks. A safe program
will behave as specified in the source code for all possible
inputs an attacker can provide. But stronger attackers can still
derail the program.
A stronger and realistic attacker model considers attackers
that can install some machine code on the computer executing
the program. This could be machine code within the virtual
address space of the process executing the program (for in-
stance because the program links to a native library controlled
by the attacker, or because it loads a binary plugin provided by
the attacker). It could also be machine code in the operating
system kernel (for instance because the attacker succeeded
in installing malware on the computer). A practical example
of this kind of attack that is gaining importance is so-called
memory-scanning malware – malware that will read the virtual
address space of running processes looking for interesting data
like credit-card numbers or passwords [3].
This attacker model is an appropriate model in cases where
software is built using third-party libraries that might be
malicious (or vulnerable, and hence might turn malicious
static int tries_left = 3; 
static int PIN = 1234; 
static int secret = 666; 
int get_secret(int provided_pin) {
if (tries_left > 0) { 
if (PIN == provided_pin) {
tries_left = 3;
return secret;} 
else { tries_left-- ; return 0; }; } 
else return 0; }
#include<stdio.h>
#include "secret.h"
// includes for other modules
void main() {
// code for main functionality
…
}
(a) The secret module
(b) Other modules of the program (c) Run-time memory contents
int get_secret(int provided_pin)
secret.c
secret.h
Machine code for 
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Fig. 2. A program with a security critical module.
after an exploit), or in cases where software might run on a
compromised platform (like on a malware infected operating
system).
As a small representative example, consider the program
in Figure 2. The program has a single module (implemented
in secret.c) that manages sensitive information, in this case
the secret variable that should only be shown to users of the
program who can provide a correct PIN. After three tries with
an incorrect PIN, the module will refuse further attempts to
protect against brute force attacks. The secret module exposes
(in it’s header file secret.h) only the get secret() function, and
hence access to the global variables in secret.c is restricted
to the secret module at source code level. Other modules
(including for instance the main() function) can only interact
with the module through the get secret() function. This mod-
ule is a very simple example of a security critical module,
like for instance the password manager in a browser or the
implementation of a cryptographic protocol. These modules
manage secrets, and even if they implement restrictions on
access to these secrets in source code (like the small example
module), they can still be subject to memory scraping attacks.
To see this, consider the compiled version of this program
at run-time. Part (c) of Figure 2 shows a schematic picture
of the memory contents at run-time. If we now consider an
attacker that can choose the machine code for some of the
other modules of the program, it is clear that the attacker
can easily violate both integrity as well as confidentiality of
the variables of the secret module. At machine code level,
there is no restriction in place for the attacker’s code to access
the memory cells containing the secret module’s variables. A
memory scraping attack is an attack where such malicious
code scans the entire virtual memory address space of a
process looking for secrets like authentication credentials,
cryptographic keys, credit card information and so forth. Even
if the source code implements restrictions on accessing these
secrets (like in the example secret module), a machine code
attacker still can easily access them.
Note an important difference with the I/O attacker: the
I/O attacker could only launch attacks in the presence of
bugs (vulnerabilities) in the program, whereas even a bug-free
program is still vulnerable to the machine code attacker.
In this Section, we consider how to protect modules like the
secret module in this example against machine code attackers.
This requires at least some form of isolation mechanism to
protect parts of the virtual address space of a process. We
discuss some of the proposed mechanisms in Subsection IV-A.
Then we discuss in Subsection IV-B how the compiler should
make use of these isolation mechanisms to guarantee security
against low-level attacks, i.e. attacks that make the protected
module behave in any way that deviates from what is specified
in the source code.
A. Isolation mechanisms
Looking back at Figure 2, it is clear that some run-time
support for isolating the various modules in a single address
space is required to offer protection against the machine code
attacker. A wide variety of such isolation mechanisms have
been studied. Some important representative mechanisms are:
• Virtual machines like the Java Virtual Machine [18] raise
the level of abstraction of compiled code such that it
gets closer to that of the source code. Compiled modules
now consist of bytecode, and both the distinction between
data and code, as well as abstraction mechanisms from
the source language (like objects with private fields) are
maintained at run time. This is a useful and widely used
mechanism, but two important disadvantages are that
(1) there is a performance penalty, as the bytecode is
essentially interpreted or just-in-time compiled to real
machine code, and (2) there is no protection against
machine code attackers that can control machine code at
lower layers of abstraction, for instance malware that has
infected the operating system kernel is not constrained by
the isolation mechanisms of the Java Virtual Machine.
• Software Fault Isolation [19] is an example of the class
of sandboxing techniques, that make it possible for a
trusted application to load untrusted binary modules
into its address space. A critical assumption for these
techniques is that the trusted application can inspect or
even modify the untrusted module before it is loaded.
By combinations of code analysis and code rewriting, the
newly loaded module can be enforced not to do any harm.
This technique is used for instance by web browsers to
run native machine code as part of a web application [20].
But an important disadvantage is that these techniques are
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Fig. 3. A protected module
fundamentally asymmetric: they protect a host application
from untrusted modules, but modules are not protected
against the host application, and a fortiori not against
malicious code in the operating system.
• Capability machines [21] provide an alternative mem-
ory protection mechanism at the level of the processor.
Instead of using integers to address memory cells, the
hardware supports capabilities, a kind of unforgeable
pointer to memory segments that can also include lim-
itations on what can be done to that memory. As a
consequence, machine code is limited in what it can do by
the capabilities it holds. Capability machines are a very
powerful technique to achieve fine-grained separation
of privileges at machine code level, and very recently
progress has been made [22] in the formal characteriza-
tion of capability safety that can lead to tool support for
proving security properties of software on such machines.
But an important downside is that they are still in a
research stage, and no widely used hardware supports
this model (yet).
• Finally, Protected Module Architectures [23], [24] offer
a simple memory access control model that can be used
to isolate modules. They have been designed both for
higher-end processors [23], [24] as well as for small
micro-processors [25], [26], [27], and recent Intel pro-
cessors provide support under the name of Intel Software
Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) [28].
static int tries_left = 3; 
static int PIN = 1234; 
static int secret = 666; 
int get_secret(int get_pin()) {
if (tries_left > 0) { 
if (PIN == get_pin()) {
tries_left = 3;
return secret;} 
else { tries_left-- ; return 0; }; } 
else return 0; }
int get_secret(int get_pin())
secret.c
secret.h
Fig. 4. An alternative secret module
For the purpose of this paper, we will zoom in on Protected
Module Architectures. Figure 3 shows how the secret module
from the program shown in Figure 2 could be loaded in a pro-
tected module. A protected module is essentially a segment of
memory, subdivided in a code part and a data part. In addition,
the module has one or more entry points, addresses pointing
into the code part of the protected module. The memory access
control model of protected module architectures essentially
enforces the following rules:
• When the Instruction Pointer (IP) is outside of the pro-
tected module, access to memory in the protected module
is prohibited.
• When the IP is inside the protected module, data memory
can be read and written, and code memory can be
executed.
• The only way for the IP to enter a protected module is
by jumping to one of the designated entry points.
This simple access control model makes it possible for mod-
ules to guard access to their private state. As shown in
Figure 3, the secret module could be compiled such that its
machine code goes into the code part of a protected module,
and its static data goes in the data part. If we provide a
single entry point to call the get secret() function, then the
variables PIN, tries left and secret can only be accessed by the
get secret() function. Because of the memory access control,
they can no longer be “scraped” from memory by malicious
machine code in one of the other modules, or even by malware
in the kernel.
B. Secure compilation
It is clear from the example discussed above, that the
compiler will need to be modified to take into account the
new protection mechanism offered by protected module archi-
tectures. And it turns out that making this compilation process
secure is non-trivial. Here is a simple example of something
that can go wrong.
Consider the variant of the secret module shown in Figure 4.
Instead of passing in a candidate pin number, here clients of
the module pass in a function pointer to a function get pin()
that the module will call to get a candidate pin from the user.
This could be useful to allow clients to call the module with
different implementations of get pin(), for instance one that
gets the candidate pin from standard input or another one that
gets the candidate pin through a graphical user interface.
An important difference is that this new implementation
accepts a function pointer as a parameter, whereas the old
implementation accepted an integer. This difference is impor-
tant: a malicious machine code client of the module can never
provide an invalid integer (any 32-bit word is a valid integer),
but it can provide invalid function pointers. Function pointers
are represented at machine code level as 32-bit addresses, but
only a few of these addresses actually point to the start of the
code of a function.
What is even worse is that an attacker can actually exploit
this to get his hands on the secret! For instance, the attacker
could pass in the address of the machine code instruction
within the compiled secret module that resets tries left to 3
(i.e. the 4th line of the get secret() function). When the secret
module calls get pin(), it will actually jump to the provided
address, i.e. it will jump to the instruction that resets the
tries left variable and then returns secret as the result of
get pin(). The function get secret() would then return 0 as
the secret is probably not equal to the PIN, but the important
thing is that the attacker has reset the tries left variable! The
attacker can use this exploit to reset the tries left counter after
each two tries, and hence can now successfully perform a brute
force attack.
We can see from this example attack that the compiler will
at least have to be very careful with arguments that outsiders
can pass into a function that runs inside a protected module.
For the example above, the compiler could for instance insert
a defensive check that makes sure that the function pointer
that is passed in should at least point to an address outside of
the protected module.
An interesting question is: how can we ever know that
defensive checks inserted by the compiler are sufficient? How
can we know that we have thought of any possible exploit?
This question is the subject of current research in the
area of secure compilation. Remember from the introduction
that our security objective is: the compiled system should
behave as specified in the source code that it is compiled
from. The standard way of formalizing this requirement is
to require the compiler to preserve and reflect observational
equivalence [29]. In other words: whatever a machine code
attacker can observe by interacting with a compiled module,
could also be observed about that module by other source
code modules interacting with the module. This is a precise
and appropriate formalization of our security objective.
The question of how to securely compile C-like source
code to protected module architectures has been the subject
of several recent papers. Agten et al. [30] were the first to
propose a secure compilation scheme, and Patrignani et al. [31]
extended this scheme to handle many source code language
features. The Sancus system [25] comes with a practical
LLVM based compiler that implements a pragmatic variant
of this secure compilation scheme.
Despite this progress, many interesting open questions re-
main. First, the work mentioned above focuses on compilation
of a single protected module, and does not handle the case of
multiple mutually distrustful modules. Extending the compiler
to securely handle multiple modules is non-trivial and the
subject of ongoing research [32], [33]. A second interesting
question is how to deal with more advanced language features,
in particular with stronger type systems. A stronger type
system for the source code language can make it easier to
reason about security properties at source code level, but it
also makes it harder for a compiler to make sure that machine
code attackers can only observe what (well-typed) source code
modules could observe. Research on proving the security of
compilations of typed languages is ongoing [34], [35].
C. Further extensions
Even if protected module architectures can use hardware-
supported memory access control to make sure that even the
operating system can not illegitimately read the state of a
protected module, the operating system might still attack the
module during loading of the module. One way to protect
against such attacks is the use of remote attestation. The
module will attest, after it has been loaded, that an unmodified
version of the module is active in protected memory. The
essence of the idea is to have the hardware derive a module-
private cryptographic key that depends on the exact code that
has been loaded (for instance by depending on a hash of
the code segment of the loaded module). If the operating
system were to modify the code of the module before loading
it, the modified module would no longer receive the correct
module-private key, and hence will fail to attest to remote
parties that it has loaded correctly. Support for this kind
of remote attestation of module authenticity is supported in
several protected module architectures [27], [25], [28].
Finally, an important question is how such protected mod-
ules will receive their initial state, and will securely store
and recover their state when they are stopped and restarted.
For initialization of the module, the provider of the module
can use the same module-private key that is used for remote
attestation. But storing and recovering state should preferably
be done locally on the device. Obviously the stored state
should be confidentiality and integrity protected using crypto-
graphic mechanisms, but in addition it should be secure against
rollback attacks where an attacker tries to feed the module
a stale stored state. Consider again the example program in
Figure 2. In the initial state the tries left variable will have
the value 3. An example of a rollback attack would be that
an attacker, after two unsuccessful tries, stops and restarts the
module feeding it again the initial state which effectively resets
the tries left variable to 3 again, thus allowing the attacker to
do a brute force attack against the PIN.
Supporting secure local storage and recovery of the states of
protected modules turns out to be challenging, in particular if
one wants to ensure liveness in the sense that random crashes
or interruptions of the protected module should not leave it in
a state where it can no longer make progress because none of
the stored states is considered fresh anymore. Several designs
have been proposed [36], [37], all of them imposing some
additional hardware requirements.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
The field of software security studies how software based
systems can maintain desirable properties in the presence of
intelligent attackers. It is useful to consider two aspects of this
problem independently:
• An application-specific part: what are the desirable prop-
erties for the application at hand? How can users of
the application misbehave? Software engineers should
elicit these security requirement, propose a solid design
with appropriate security countermeasures, and finally
implement the desired application in source code taking
care to avoid implementation vulnerabilities like the use
of weak cryptography or incomplete mediation for access
control.
• An application-independent but execution-platform-
specific part: how can the execution platform ensure that
the software based system will behave as specified in the
source code, even in the presence of intelligent attackers
that actively try to derail the software?
This paper has focused on the second aspect: how can one
ensure that software that is compiled from source code to ma-
chine code on a specific execution platform can be guaranteed
to behave as specified in the source code, and this for two
kinds of attackers.
First, we discussed how memory safety vulnerabilities in
unsafe languages like C allow attackers to derail software
using an incredibly wide range of attack techniques for which
the attacker only needs the ability to send input to and receive
output from the software. We also surveyed part of the arsenal
of countermeasures that C developers can rely on to make
such attacks more difficult. The problem of protecting unsafe
code against such I/O attackers is by now well understood, but
such attacks still make up a significant fraction of the security
incidents reported today.
Second, this paper also made the case that, in practice,
even stronger attacker models should be considered. We
discussed the model of the machine code attacker, that can
execute arbitrary machine code in the virtual address space
of the program under attack, or in the operating system. This
is a more challenging problem, and research into adequate
security mechanisms is still ongoing. We discussed some of
the mechanisms that are already used in practice, and in
particular zoomed in on the mechanism of Protected Module
Architectures, supported in modern processors. Finally, we
explained how compilers can use this mechanism to protect
software against machine code attackers.
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